Tax Deductions for Parents of Children Attending Public and Nonpublic Schools: Mueller v. Allen by Miller, George
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 71 | Issue 3 Article 8
1983
Tax Deductions for Parents of Children Attending
Public and Nonpublic Schools: Mueller v. Allen
George Miller
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miller, George (1983) "Tax Deductions for Parents of Children Attending Public and Nonpublic Schools: Mueller v. Allen," Kentucky
Law Journal: Vol. 71 : Iss. 3 , Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol71/iss3/8
Tax Deductions for Parents




The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
Mueller v. Allen,1 a case in which the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a Minnesota statute2 authorizing personal in-
come tax deductions for tuition, textbook and transportation ex-
penses incurred on behalf of dependents attending public and
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools did not violate the
establishment clause of the first amendment. 3 In reaching its de-
cision, the Eighth Circuit was aware that the First Circuit Court
of Appeals had recently struck down a virtually identical Rhode
Island statute4 in Rhode Island Federation of Teachers, AFL-
' 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W 3253 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1982) (No. 82-195).
2 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09, subd. 22 (West Supp. 1982). This statute provides for
the following deduction from gross income:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others,
not to exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each de-
pendent in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each
dependent in attending an elementary or secondary school wherein a
resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance
laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision,
"textbooks" shall mean and include books and other instructional materials
and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools m teaching only
those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secon-
dary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and mate-
nals used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the pur-
pose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall it in-
clude such books or materials for, or transportation to, extracurricular activ-
ities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events, speech activities,
driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
3 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion "U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
4 R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980). This statute provides the following de-
duction:
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CIO v. Norberg. 5 Moreover, the court in Mueller recognized that
this conflict between the circuits over the troublesome issue of
the constitutional limits of state aid to nonpublic education pre-
sents a significant problem that must be resolved by the Supreme
Court.6 The purpose of this Comment is to determine whether
the statute reviewed in Mueller violates the establishment clause.
It concludes that the transportation deduction is permissible, but
the tuition and textbook deductions are not.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST
During the past three decades, the United States Supreme
Court has developed a three part test for deciding whether a stat-
ute is within the limits imposed by the establishment clause. As
summarized in the Court's opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman,7 the
(c) Modifications Reducing Federal Adjusted Gross Income. There
shall be subtracted from federal adjusted gross income (2) amounts
paid to others, not to exceed five hundred ($500) dollars for each dependent
in kindergarten through sixth (6th) grade and seven hundred ($700) dollars
for each dependent in grades seven (7) through twelve (12) inclusive, for tu-
ition, textbooks, and transportation of each such dependent attending an
elementary or secondary school wherein a resident of this state may
legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated
for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. As used in this section, "textbooks" shall mean and include books and
other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secon-
dary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in
public elementary schools in this state and shall not include instructional
books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or
worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or wor-
ship.
" 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
6 676 F.2d at 1201.
7 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). This three part test will hereinafter be referred to as
the Lemon test. The Lemon test has not provided "bright line" guidance in adjudicating
establishment clause disputes. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 760-61 (1973). One explanation is that the test is merely a "guideline," Til-
ton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971), and that no greater precision should be ex-
pected because the problem is one of "degree," Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736, 766 (1976). Moreover, greater "analytical tidiness" would result in an absolute prohi-
bition of aid to parochial schools, which would be contrary to the public intereWt. Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A less charitable explanation is that the test is the result of ad hoc decisions which are not
grounded on any constitutional principle. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
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test requires a statute to: 1) have a secular legislative purpose; 2)
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and 3) not foster excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion. If a statute fails to meet any of these conditions, it must be
struck down.
A. The Secular Purpose Test
To meet the Lemon test of constitutionality, a statute must
have a secular legislative purpose. Generally, the Court has
tended to accept legislative statements of secular purpose at face
value and has not struck down any legislation authorizing aid to
nonpublic schools on this ground.9 Thus, even where a statute
has been struck down because it violated the second or third
parts of the Lemon test, the Court has accepted claims that the
legislation served secular purposes, such as ensuring student
health, welfare, or safety 0 or providing a fertile educational en-
vironment. 11
B. The Przmary Effect Test
The second part of the Lemon test requires a finding that the
government activity has a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion. However, the Court has refrained from
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 680 (1980). Indeed, one
commentator has suggested that the Constitution is "irrelevant" to the Court's decisions.
Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 3 (1979).
Whatever the merits of these different but logically consistent explanations, the
Court's application of the Lemon test reveals a concern for certain fundamental problems
which aids analysis of establishment clause cases. One of the Court's major concerns has
been to prevent three "evils" against which the establishment clause protects: "sponsor-
ship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 413
U.S. at 772; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668 (1970). To avoid these evils, government activity must not have the purpose or pri-
mary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and it must not foster an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.
8 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
9 See Minnesota Civil Liberties Umon v. Roemer, 452 F Supp. 1316, 1318 n.1 (D.
Minn. 1978).
10 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyqtust, 413 U.S. at 773.
11 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 236.
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making the "metaphysical"' 12 judgments necessary to determine
whether an effect is primary Instead, it has upheld legislation
that has only a "remote and incidental"'3 effect of aiding religion.
Whether a remote effect test is any less metaphysical than a pri-
mary effect test is doubtful.14 But the former is clearly more strin-
gent than the latter, for the Court has said that it would strike
down legislation that had a "direct and immediate"' 5 effect of
supporting religion even if the primary effect were secular, e.g.,
a law requiring prayer or Bible reading in public schools for the
secular purpose of promoting morality 16
In practice, two criteria determine whether legislation will
pass the primary effect test. First, and more important, the type
of activity aided must be such that its secular aspects are "identi-
fiable and separable"'17 from its religious aspects. For example,
the Court has scrutinized aid to elementary and secondary paro-
chial schools more carefully than aid to church-related colleges
because it regards the former as "religion-pervasive institu-
tions."'" Because parochial schools teach and promote a partic-
ular religious faith and are an integral part of the mission of a
sponsoring church, 9 the secular and the religious aspects of edu-
cation are inseparable, thus making it impossible to aid only the
secular aspects. As a result, aid to such schools is frequently
struck down. In contrast, the Court on three occasions 0 has up-
held aid to church-related colleges, in part because it does not re-
gard them as "religion-pervasive" institutions. Their purpose is
not to indoctrinate students, college students are thought to be
12 413 U.S. at 783 n.39.
13 Id.
14 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 840 (1978).
15 413 U.S. at 783 n.39.
16 Id.
17 Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973). See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 250; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365
(1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775.
18 421 U.S. at 366.
19 These characteristics of parochial schools are part of a standard profile of ten char-
actenstics adopted by the Court. See id. at 356.
20 See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. at 736; Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1972); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 672.
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less susceptible to indoctrination, and there is more academic
freedom.2 1
A corollary to the first criterion under the primary effect test
is that the form of aid and the nature of the beneficiary must be
such that a legislature can be certain that only secular education-
al activities are aided .2 But since the secular and the religious as-
pects of education in elementary and secondary parochial schools
are difficult to separate, legislatures cannot be certain that direct
aid to the educational function of such schools benefits only sec-
•ular activities. Although teachers and administrators may well
act in good faith, the possibility that aid will be used to advance
religion in the classroom "inheres in the situation."2 For this
reason, the Court has struck down various forms of aid to such
schools, including loans of instructional materials and equip-
ment,24 reimbursements to parents for the cost of field trip trans-
portation,2- tuition grants26 and tuition tax deductions.27 On the
other hand, reimbursements for the cost of transportation to and
from school and for the cost of therapeutic and diagnostic ser-
vices2 have been upheld because they are sufficiently remote
from teaching activities. Legislatures can be certain that the lat-
ter services are not manipulated toward religious ends by requir-
ing that they be provided by non-school personnel, given off
school premises, or both. Even textbook loans are permissible be-
cause legislatures can require that texts deal only with subjects
taught in public schools. 30
21 403 U.S. at 685-86.
22 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 652
(1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 369-70; Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619.
23 Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Edue. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. at 480. See also
403 U.S. at 618-19.
24 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 229; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 349.
2- 433 U.S. at 229.
26 Committee for Pub. Edue. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756.
271d.
28 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
29 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 229.




The second criterion of the primary effect test is that the class
of beneficiaries be broad. 31 If the class is too narrow, the legisla-
tion is suspect because of its potential political divisiveness.32
Consequently, legislation providing aid only to nonpublic schools
is more difficult to uphold than legislation providing aid to both
public and nonpublic schools.3 However, unlike the first cri-
terion, this criterion is not determinative. For instance, the court
has upheld aid directed to nonpublic schools only34 and it has said
that the facial neutrality of a statute would not in itself be suffi-
cient to survive constitutional scrutiny in certain circumstances.-
C. The Entanglement Test
A statute must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion in order to meet the third requirement of the
Lemon test. Excessive entanglements can be fostered in two
ways. The first is where administrative procedures used by the
state to monitor a religious institution's compliance with the
challenged statute would interfere or conflict too much with reli-
gion. For example, the Court has held unconstitutional a statute
which provided for reimbursement for the cost of instructional
material and equipment, because direct surveillance of classroom
activities would be necessary to ensure that the material and
equipment were not used for religious purposes."6 On the other
hand, the Court has upheld tax exemptions for religious property
used solely for religious worship on the ground that taxing such
property would result in "tax valuation of church property, tax
liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts
that follow in the train of those legal processes." 37
31 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyqist, 413 U.S. at 794; L.
TRIBE, supra note 14, at 845-46.
32 See 413 U.S. at 794.
33 See id. at 782 n.38; L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 845 n.33.
34 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. at 646; Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 229.
35 In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. at 747, the Court stated that a
"[sitate may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious education even
though it makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions alike."
36 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619.
37 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674.
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The second way in which legislation can foster excessive gov-
ernmental entanglement with religion is by causing "continuing
political strife over aid to religion"3 or "political divisiveness re-
lated to religious belief and practice." 39 These "political entangle-
ments"40 arise when legislatures must make annual appropri-
ations to aid religion or there is otherwise continuing pressure to
increase the amount of aid. 41 Under these circumstances, the
prospect might arise "of repeated confrontation between propo-
nents and opponents" 42 of aid, as well as competition among reli-
gious groups for government support. 43 With a keen awareness of
the political strife such conflicts caused in colonial America, the
Court has attempted to prevent their recurrence. 44
38 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794.
39 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 623.
40 L. TmBE, supra note 14, at 866.
41 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyqist, 413 U.S. at 796-97
42 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 372.
43 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 8-11, for a discussion of such competi-
tion and the resulting persecution in colonial America.
4 Arguably, preventing political strife over aid to religion is the fundamental p6licy
underlying the Lemon test. Under this view, the Court's concern is not just to prevent
sponsorship, financial support and active involvement of government in religious activity,
but also to prevent the perception that these evils exist. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 844.
In other words, the Court's concern is preventing the "symbolic identification" of govern-
ment and religion. Id. at 843. If certain forms of aid symbolize government support of re-
ligion, then regardless of whether the government is truly supporting religion, the risk of
political strife increases.
The Supreme Court's application of the Lemon test to cases involving aid to non-
public schools reveals its concern about the symbolic identification of government and reli-
gion. This concern is obvious with regard to the secular purpose, breadth-of-class and
political entanglement tests. But it also underlies the other parts of the test. For example,
the requirement that secular activities be identifiable and separable from religious activ-
ities is best explained by the fact that aid to secular activities is not perceived as aid to reli-
gion. See id. at 844. Clearly, police and fire protection, student transportation, textbook
loans, and diagnostic and therapeutic tests all aid religion "by rendering it more likely that
children would attend sectarian schools and by freeing the budgets of those schools for use
in other non-secular areas." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyqust,
413 U.S. at 775. Yet, such aid has been upheld after being characterized as merely "in-
direct and incidental," id., despite the actual benefit provided religion.
The Court's refusal to uphold a statute unless the legislature is certain that the aid
provided will not be used to inject religion into the classroom also is consistent with its con-
cern for symbolic identification of government with religion. For example, in several cases
the Court has ignored evidence that teachers have not injected religion into the classroom.
See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 392 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. at 618. The Court also has ignored evidence revealing that the probability of aid
being used to further religious ends will be minimal. 413 U.S. at 777-79, 787. This lack of
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND TAx DEDUCTIONS
A. Mueller v Allen
In Mueller v. Allen, 45 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a challenge to a Minnesota statute which authorized
deductions from gross personal income for tuition, textbook and
transportation expenses incurred on behalf of dependents attend-
ing public and nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. The
plaintiff, a Minnesota taxpayer, argued that the statute failed the
Lemon test because the purpose and primary effect of the statute
was to support and advance religion in that "the overwhelming
percentage of tax relief granted under the statute was for tuition
expenditures for religiously affiliated education.- 46
concern for empirical evidence indicates a greater concern for whether the aid appears to
benefit religion.
Finally, the administrative entanglement test also reveals a concern for symbolic
identification, though the concern here relates primarily to a perception of government
hostility toward religion. For example, the tax exemptions for church property upheld in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n were upheld partly because taxing church property symbolizes hos-
tility toward religion, while tax exemptions symbolize neutrality. 397 U.S. at 673-80; id.
at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring). Further, the Court has approved imposing standards of
public education on parochial schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
and issuing construction bonds for church-related colleges where, in case of default, the
state could foreclose on the property, Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). Since such
state action requires or could require vast administrative interference with religion, a
plausible explanation is that such interference is acceptable because it is not perceived as
hostile to religion.
Thus, the principle of "symbolic identification" is much more useful in analyzing
establishment clause cases than the principle of government "neutrality" toward religion
which the Court and some commentators have advocated. See Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. at 766; Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 793; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment: Part II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 517-19 (1968).
Whatever its appeal as an ideal, the principle of neutrality is difficult to apply. If the focus
is on aid to education, it is hard to see, on the one hand, how the principle of neutrality
permits any aid to parochial schools, including police and fire protection. To argue that
such minimal aid is permissible because it also is given to public schools proves too much
because complete subsidization would then be justified. See Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. On the other hand, it is hard to see
how the principle of neutrality justifies only the minimal aid the Court has approved.
Under current economic and social conditions, this policy leaves parochial schools at a
serious competitive disadvantage as compared to public schools, thereby arguably inhibit-
ing religion. Cf. Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tu-
ition Tax Credits, 92 HAav. L. REV. 696, 700-05 (1979).
45 676 F.2d at 1195.
41 Id. at 1198-99. In support of this argument, the plaintiff alleged: 1) that only
[Vol. 71
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The court rejected this argument. First, it agreed with the
district court that the purpose of the statute was to enhance the
quality of education in both public and nonpublic schools and
thus benefit all taxpayers. 47 Second, it held that the primary ef-
fect of the statute was not to support and advance religion be-
cause there were "substantial benefits flowing to all members of
the public" 48 and the benefit to religion was "remote and inciden-
tal."49 Finally, it held that "church-state contacts occasioned by
normal tax administration procedures do not give rise to exces-
sive . government and religion entanglements." 50
The court devoted most of its analysis to the issue of the pri-
mary effect of the statute. It quickly found5' that the deduction
for transportation expenses was permissible under Everson v.
Board of Education,5 2 which upheld reimbursements to parents
for the cost of transportation to both public and nonpublic
schools.
The court dealt with the textbook deduction at greater
length. Although Board of Education v. Allen,5 which upheld
textbook loans to students in public and nonpublic schools, is pre-
cedent for such aid, the Minnesota statute defined "textbooks" to
include "instructional materials and eqtupment." Tie Supreme
Court has held that loans of such instructional materials and
equipment are unconstitutional,- but the court of appeals in
Mueller distinguished those cases because they concerned loans
made directly to the schools, whereas the Minnesota statute gave
the corresponding financial benefit to the "parent and the stu-
3.71% to 4.56% of the pupils attending nonpublic schools in Minnesota between 1978 and
1980 attended nonsectarian schools; 2) that the state lost $2.4 million from the deduction
and 71% of the loss was due to deductions by parents of children m sectarian schools; and
3) that Minnesota public schools are free for most residents. Id.47 Id. at 1198.
48 Id. at 1205.
49 Id. at 1206.
50 Id. at 1202 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 514 F Supp. 998, 1003 (D. Minn. 1981)).
51 Id. at 1201.
52 330 U.S. at 1.
53 392 U.S. at 236.
54 See note 2 supra for the text of this statute.
5 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 229; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 349; Pub-
lic Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), affd mem.,
417 U.S. 961 (1974).
1982-831
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dent and not to the school." 56 In addition, the court distinguished
the cases because the type of instructional material and equip-
ment useful to students, e.g., rulers and tennis shoes, differs from
the type useful to schools, e.g., maps and globes. 7 Because of
these distinctions, the court held that the textbook deduction was
permissible, 5 reasoning that any benefit to religion was more
"indirect '59 than benefits the Supreme Court had encountered in
similar cases.
The tuition deduction presented the most difficult question
for the court in Mueller because of the Supreme Court's decision
in Committee for Public Education & Religous Liberty v. Ny-
quist. 60 Nyquist struck down a New York statute which provided,
inter alia, direct tuition reimbursements to parents with an an-
nual income less than $5,00061 and a tax deduction for tuition ex-
penses to parents with an annual income between $5,000 and
$25,000.62 The court distinguished Nyquist on two grounds.
First, it stated that the New York statute operated as a tax credit,
not a true tax deduction,6 because it was designed "to assure that
each family would receive a carefully estimated net benefit." 64
Conversely, the Minnesota statute operated to reduce an individ-
ual's tax liability only if the allowable deductions from the indivi-
dual's gross income put him in a lower tax bracket. Thus, any
benefit to "the school is more diffused and less certain." 66 Second,
Nyquzst was distinguished on the basis that the New York statute
56 676 F.2d at 1202. The court incorrectly characterized the Wolman decision as one
involving loans made directly to the schools. In Wolman, the loans were actually made to
the pupils or their parents. 433 U.S. at 248. See notes 93-96 tnfra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Wolman decision as it relates to Mueller.
57 676 F.2d at 1202.58Id.
59 Id.
60 413 U.S. at 756.
61 Id. at 780-89.
62 Id. at 789-94.
r 676 F.2d at 1203.
64 Id. at 1204 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 790). Because the statute struck down in Nyqutst did not provide merely a tax de-
duction, the Court in Nyqutst expressly refrained from deciding whether a tax deduction
"such as for charitable contributions" violated the establishment clause. 413 U.S. at 790
n.49.
6 676 F.2d at 1204.
6 Id.
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gave a deduction only to parents of children attending nonpublic
schools, whereas the Minnesota statute gave a deduction to par-
ents of children attending either public or nonpublic schools.
Thus, the latter statute "has not singled out a class of citizens for
a special economic benefit. It is neutral on its face."6'
The court held that these differences were sufficient to up-
hold the tuition deduction. Otherwise, an "imponderable prob-
lem [is] presented if one is allowed to challenge a neutral statute
made applicable to all citizens by a purely de facto analysis util-
izing statistical proofs."' If this were allowed, the court con-
cluded, charitable deductions and other programs which provide
"a substantial benefit. . to a religious institution" 69 could be
challenged, even though they do not have the primary effect of
advancing religion.
B. Analysis of Mueller v. Allen
1. The Tuition Deduction
a. The Primary Effect Test
Mueller held that the tuition deduction passed both the pri-
mary effect test and the entanglement test. With regard to the
primary effect test, it held that the tuition deduction was consti-
tutional largely because it provided benefits to parents of chil-
dren attending either public or nonpublic schools. Thus the court
approached the primary effect test by asking whether the statute
meets the second criterion of the test, namely, that the benefitted
class be broad.70 It held that, in this case, the class was sufficient-
ly broad because the statute was facially neutral. In contrast,
Rhode Island Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg71
held that the benefitted class was too narrow because the over-
whelming majority of people eligible for the deduction sent their
children to sectarian schools. Thus, Mueller used a de jure inter-
67 Id.
6 81d. at 1205.
69 d.
7°See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of flus criterion.
71 630 F.2d at 859-61.
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pretation of the breadth-of-class test, while Norberg used a de
facto interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court has never had occasion to
decide which interpretation is correct. 72 However, in light of the
Court's view that the breadth-of-class test is an important factor
"in terms of the potential divisiveness of any legislative mea-
sure,- 73 a de facto interpretation seems more appropriate because
even a facially neutral statute can be divisive if perceived as aid
to religion. The Minnesota statute arguably fails the breadth-of-
class test when the de facto standard is applied. Because the over-
whelming majority of people who would be eligible for the de-
duction have children attending religious schools, the statute
could easily be perceived as aid to religion, with potentially di-
visive effects. In this respect, the statute differs from statutes that
provide tax exemptions for church property, which have been
upheld because churches belong to a large class of nonprofit insti-
tutions and there is little potential for divisiveness over such aid. 74
If a de facto standard is used in applying the breadth-of-class
test, the Minnesota statute's facial neutrality is not sufficient to
distinguish it from the New York statute struck down in Commit-
tee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.75 This
leaves the second ground upon which the court in Mueller distin-
guished Nyquist, namely that the Minnesota statute merely pro-
vides a potential tax deduction while the New York statute op-
erated as a tax credit designed to assure a certain benefit regard-
less of how much tuition the taxpayers had actually paid. The
Mueller court believed that this distinction was relevant because
72 In Nyqutst, the Court expressly refrained from deciding "whether the significantly
religious character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the present cases from a
case involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally
without regard to the sectarian/nonsectarian, or public/nonpublic nature of the institution
benefitted." 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
" Id. at 794. The Court refrained from "intimating whether this factor alone might
have controlling significance in another context." Id.
74 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 664. In Nyqutst, the Court distinguished
Walz as follows: "The exemption challenged in Walz was not restricted to a class com-
posed exclusively or even predominantly of religious institutions As the parties here
must concede, tax reductions authorized by this law flow primarily to the parents of chil-
dren attending sectarian, nonpublic schools." 413 U.S. at 794 (emphasis added).
75413 U.S. at 756.
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it thought that the Minnesota taxpayer (and, indirectly, the non-
public school) would benefit only if the deduction's effect was to
place the taxpayer in a lower tax bracket. 76 However, under the
Minnesota tax law, any deduction from gross income would
benefit a taxpayer by lowering his or her taxable income and,
ultimately, his or her tax liability.77 Although the Minnesota stat-
ute is not designed to reduce by a predetermined amount the
amount of tax due, it is clearly designed to confer some benefit on
anyone who takes the deduction. Thus, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the statute has the direct and immediate effect
of-advancing religion, it seems indistinguishable from the statute
struck down in Nyquist. 78
In attempting to distinguish Nyquzst, the court in Mueller ig-
nored the first criterion of the primary effect test: the require-
ment that legislatures must be able to identify and separate the
secular and the religious functions of religious institutions and be
certain that only the former are aided. 79 Even if the Minnesota
and New York statutes are distinguishable, the Minnesota statute
76 676 F.2d at 1203-04.
77 The Minnesota tax rate table for 1981 is:
Taxable Income Rates Taxable Income Rates
$ 0to$ 654 1.6% $ 6532to$ 9144 10.2%
654to 1308 2.2% 9144to 11,756. 11.5%
1308 to 2614 3.5% 11,756 to 16,327 12.8%
2614to 3920 5.8% 16,327to 26,121 14.0%
3920 to 5226 7.3% 26,121 to 35,915 15.0%
5226 to 6532 8.8% 35,915 and over 16.0%
ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) 15-546. According to this table, any deduction from gross income
will ultimately lower one's tax liability even if it does not put one in a lower tax bracket.
78 Even if a taxpayer were to benefit only if a deduction put him or her in a lower tax
bracket, and even if any benefit to the taxpayer were less certain for the additional reasons
that the taxpayer would benefit only if he or she "has made eligible expendi-
tures, itemized deductions, [and] has taxable income after all other deductions
have been taken," Minnesota Civil Liberties Umon v. Roemer, 452 F Supp. at 1321,
arguably the tuition deduction would still fail the primary effect test. In Nyquist, the
Supreme Court rejected several attempts to uphold the New York statute on the ground of
"a statistical guarantee of neutrality." 413 U.S. at 787. The primary effect test requires
that legislatures be certain that aid does not flow to the religious function of religious insti-
tutions, and a s'tatistical argument purporting to show that not every parent with a child
attending a parochial school will benefit from the Minnesota statute does not provide the
requisite certainty.
79 See text accompanying notes 17-30 supra for a discussion of this requirement.
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still must meet this requirement."° In Nyquist, the Supreme
Court held that the New York tax credit for tuition expenses at
nonpublic schools was unconstitutional because the aid was not
"sufficiently restricted to assure that it will not have the imper-
missible effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious
schools."81 The Minnesota tuition tax deduction seems unconsti-
tutional for the same reason. The deduction is for tuition ex-
penses at primary and secondary schools, institutions which the
Court has found to be "religion-pervasive." 82 If the tuition pays
for basic educational needs such as teachers' salaries and instruc-
tional materials and equipment and not just for secular programs
such as transportation or therapeutic and diagnostic services, the
deduction-which will encourage people to send their children
to religious schools-fails the primary effect test because legisla-
tures cannot be certain that the sectarian activities of such
schools are not being aided.
b. The Entanglement Test
Mueller also held that the tuition deduction satisfies the en-
tanglement test because the church-state contacts resulting from
normal tax administration procedures are not excessive. Here the
court merely relied upon the district court's holding which, in
turn, was based upon Walz v. Tax Commission. 3 However, it is
a mistake to rely on Walz for the proposition that tax benefits in
general do not violate the entanglement test. First, Walz was de-
cided primarily on the ground that taxing church property would
create excessive entanglements with religion.& As the Court
noted in Nyquist, the Walz decision was an attempt "to minimize
involvement and entanglement between Church and
State . The granting of tax benefits, . unlike the exten-
80 While such an assumption seems reasonable, the Supreme Court has not expressly
ruled that both criteria of the primary effect test must be satisfied before a statute will be
upheld.
8' 413 U.S. at 794.
82 See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra for a discussion of the religion-pervasive
nature of sectarian schools.
83 397 U.S. at 664.
84 See text accompanying note 37 supra for a discussion of Walz.
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sion of an exemption, would tend to increase rather than limit
the involvement between Church and State." 5 Second, tax
exemptions for church property were justified in Walz because of
the symbolism of the tax exemptions: churches are part of a large
class of nonprofit institutions that receive property tax exemp-
tions; thus, such exemptions symbolize a neutral state attitude to-
ward religion, while taxing church property used for religious
purposes would symbolize hostility 80 In contrast, tax deductions
for parents of children attending nonpublic schools do not sym-
bolize neutrality. Although the Minnesota tax deduction is also
available to parents of children attending public schools, it will
be perceived as aid to religion because the overwhelming major-
ity of people who will benefit from the deduction have children
who attend religious schools . 7
Not only is the Mueller analysis of the entanglement test defi-
cient because of its reliance on Walz, it also is deficient because it
focuses only on administrative entanglements, ignoring possible
political entanglements. Nyquist held that such entanglements
accompany tax benefits because of the "pressure for frequent en-
largement of [tax] relief" and the state's desire to comply in
order to relieve itself of the burden of educating more children in
public schools. Since the evidence indicates that religious groups
benefit more from this type of tax relief than other groups, they
will have greater incentive to seek more relief, and this could re-
sult in the land of lobbying by religious groups that the Supreme
Court has sought to avoid.89
2. The Textbook Deduction
a. The Primary Effect Test
The Minnesota textbook deduction seems to violate both the
primary effect test and the entanglement test. With regard to the
former, the statute defines "textbooks" to include "instructional
85 413 U.S. at 793.
80 397 U.S. at 673-80; id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurnng).
87 See Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 861.
"' 413 U.S. at 797.
89 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 622.
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
materials and equipment,"9 and the Supreme Court has held re-
peatedly that loans of, or reimbursements for, such equipment
are unconstitutional because legislatures cannot guarantee that
the equipment will not be used for sectarian purposes. 91 The
Mueller court attempted to distinguish these precedents primar-
ily by arguing that they concerned aid given directly to schools,
while the Minnesota statute granted the benefit to the parent and
the student.92 However, a careful reading of Wolman v. Walter93
reveals that the statute in that case authorized "expenditures of
funds for the purchase and loan to pupils or their parents upon
individual request of instructional materials and instructional
equipment." 94 Yet the Court still held that the expenditures were
unconstitutional. Moreover, it expressly rejected an attempt to
justify the aid by distinguishing between aid to schools and aid to
parents or pupils, stating that "it would exalt form over sub-
stance if this distinction were found to justify" the aid.9 5
b. The Entanglement Test
With regard to the entanglement test, the Supreme Court has
held that aid in the form of instructional materials and equip-
ment violates the test because the measures that would be neces-
sary to ensure that the aid is not used for sectarian purposes are
too intrusive. That the benefit in Mueller is a tax deduction
rather than a direct loan of equipment seems irrelevant. In either
case, the legislature must be certain that the equipment is not
used for sectarian purposes. Since this would create excessive ad-
90 See note 2 supra for the text of this statute.
91 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 229; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 349;
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 602.
92 676 F.2d at 1202.
" 433 U.S. at 229.
94 Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 250. The court in Mueller also distinguished these cases by arguing that the
type of instructional materials and equipment available to pupils in Minnesota, e.g.,
rulers and tennis shoes, differed significantly from the type available in earlier cases, e.g.,
projectors, tape recorders, record players, and maps and globes, because the former were
less useful to the schools than the latter. 676 F.2d at 1202. But to the extent that this dis-
tinction rests on a distinction between aid to schools and aid to pupils, it must be rejected
for the reasons Wolman v. Walter rejected the latter distinction.
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ministrative entanglements, the Minnesota textbook deduction
violates the entanglement test.96
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the court's holding in Mueller, certain provisions
of Minnesota's statute authorizing income tax deductions for tu-
ition, textbook and transportation expenses fail to satisfy all three
parts of the Lemon test 97 and therefore violate the first amend-
ment's establishment clause. 9 The tax deduction for transporta-
ton expenses is permissible,99 but the deductions for expenditures
for tuition and textbooks violate the establishment clause.10
The principal case regarding tax relief for parents of children
attending nonpublic schools is Committee for Public Education
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquzst.10' Mueller attempted to distin-
guish Nyquist by focusing on the Minnesota statute's facial neu-
trality and the fact that the statute granted a tax deduction
rather than a disguised tax credit. As the preceding discussion in-
dicates,12 this attempt fails. Moreover, Mueller did not address
the most important issue concerning the primary effect test,
namely whether the legislature could be certain that only secular
educational activities were aided. A legislature cannot be certain
of this when the aid is a tax deduction for expenses on instruc-
tional materials and equipment and tuition at "religion-perva-
- 96 This is consistent with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 602, where the Court
struck down a statute which provided schools with reimbursements for expenditures on in-
structional materials and equipment rather than loans of equipment. Whether the statute
provides reimbursements to the school or tax deductions to the parents who purchase the
items, the result would still be the excessive administrative entanglement which the Court
has said must be avoided.
97 See notes 7-43 supra and accompanying text for an analysis of the three criteria
which comprise the Lemon test.
98 See note 3supra.
99 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld reimbursement for such expenses in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 1.
100 Whether the unconstitutionality of the Minnesota statute warrants the conclusion
that deductions for charitable contributions to religious institutions also are unconstitu-
tional, as the court in Mueller feared, is unclear. Arguably, such .deductions pass at least
the primary effect test because religious institutions are members of a broad class of insti-
tutions which receive charitable support.
11 413 U.S. at 756.
102 See notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
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sive" institutions. Thus the statute fails the primary effect test.
However, even if it passed this test, arguably it would still violate
the establishment clause because it fails both the administrative
and political entanglement tests.
George Miller
